Existential Therapy and ECCA
Unhurried Philosopher

This text grew out of a question that arose at the intersection of existential therapy and philosophical practice. In both, we meet a human being who can be touched by the questions of human existence in the most direct, and at times agonizing, ways. But what happens when these questions become the focus of a philosophical dialogue? And can we speak of a special possibility that such a conversation opens up for someone who has already, long and unwillingly, been entangled in the philosophical dilemmas of their own life?
Searching for an answer, I remembered a Belarusian word that, it seems to me, can serve as a doorway into this conversation. It is this word that I have placed in the title of this text.
In contemporary Belarusian, pavoĺny primarily means “slow,” “unhurried,” “deliberate.” Isci pavoĺna means to walk without rushing. Yet this word carries another layer of meaning, one nearly lost today. In older dictionaries, pavoĺny also meant “free,” “at liberty,” “unrestricted”; pavoĺna meant freely, easily, without strain; pavoĺnasć meant freedom. There is even a wonderful verb, pavoĺnić—to loosen, to ease up, to grant more freedom. Pavoĺnić viaroŭku means to slacken the rope a little.
I love how the history of a single Belarusian word weaves together two seemingly distant meanings: slowness and freedom. What, then, might we hear in the words “pavoĺny filosof”?
We might say that this is a slow philosopher—slow in the sense of allowing oneself not to know in advance where thought must lead, of allowing oneself to stay with a question for as long as it asks. One might object: isn't every philosopher like that? And yet, I am reminded of a colleague's story about a client who, becoming captivated by philosophy, swiftly concluded that life is meaningless and that any thinking person must end their own life. Him, I would call a fast philosopher.
Yet a “pavoĺny filosof” is also a free philosopher. A philosopher of one's own free will.
And this notion of “free will” genuinely absorbs me. What does it mean to be a philosopher willingly? What kind of freedom can exist here at all? Because a “philosopher of free will” immediately brings to mind another, deeply familiar figure: the unwilling philosopher.
Let us recall that Alice Holzhey-Kunz uses the term “unwilling philosopher” to describe someone with a particular ontological sensitivity—Hellhörigkeit. Such a person is acutely attuned to those conditions of human existence that everyday life usually allows us to overlook, or at least not notice constantly: finitude, groundlessness, the impossibility of absolute safety, and the fact that our own existence is never entirely at our disposal.
At the same time, the “unwilling philosopher” does not know they are a philosopher. Their sensitivity reveals itself primarily through suffering—in symptoms, anxiety, obsessions, and the inability to make peace with things away from which others somehow manage to look. Herein lies their “unwillingness”: the philosophical dimension of their own existence discloses itself against their will. But there is another difficulty here: they have already heard something about their own existence, yet they do not understand what they have heard. Consequently, they experience themselves not as a philosopher, but as sick, as someone who is fundamentally broken. What could be understood as a profound sensitivity to human existence is instead experienced as an inherent inadequacy or defect.
In this sense, one could say that the unwilling philosopher suffers twice over: from what they have heard, and from the inability to understand their suffering as anything other than proof that something is wrong with them. Or perhaps even three times over, because the unwilling philosopher tries to resolve ontological questions on an ontic level, and this acting-out is just as agonizing: it does not work, and the person is forced to confront this “it doesn't work, it doesn't help” again and again.
And so, alongside this person suffering from their own being—this “unwilling philosopher”—I would like to place the curious figure of the pavoĺny filosof, the philosopher by will. The one does not (and cannot) simply cancel out the other. Rather, I am interested in whether a person who finds themselves an unwilling philosopher can also discover the possibility of philosophizing willingly. Can that which once only descended upon them as suffering become a philosophical question in whose formulation and exploration they themselves actively take part?
Let us leave this question open for a moment and return to Holzhey-Kunz herself. She emphasizes that this acute philosophical sensitivity is not, in itself, a pathology or a defect from which a person needs to be cured. Moreover, if the truth disclosing itself did not overwhelm them so intensely, this sensitivity could well be considered a gift.
Naturally, the unwilling philosopher does not experience their suffering as a gift. The very thought can easily sound insulting: try living with such a gift yourself. For the unwilling philosopher, their sensitivity is an experience of radical unfreedom: they did not choose what was revealed to them, they cannot unhear it, and at the same time they do not know what to do with what they have heard. And if we still hold a greater degree of freedom, of “pavoĺnasć,” as a gentle horizon, the question arises: what movements in that direction are even possible? How can we “pavoĺnić” this rope—loosen this noose around the neck (which, for a suffering person, hardly feels like an exaggeration)?
If I understand Holzhey-Kunz correctly, in Daseinsanalytic therapy one such movement occurs when the therapist begins to listen to the patient with a “philosophical ear.”
What does it mean to listen with a “philosophical ear”? One might understand this simply: the patient speaks of one thing, and the therapist discerns beneath it another—the philosophical core of their suffering. Behind the fear of illness lies finitude; behind an agonizing choice, ontological guilt; behind shame, the facticity of one's own being. But then the therapist's philosophical sensitivity risks turning into mere philosophical interpretation, implying that the therapist is a “knowing philosopher” standing over an “unknowing” one.
Holzhey-Kunz's “philosophical ear” seems to be attuned differently. Listening to the patient, the therapist recognizes in their suffering not merely a philosophical theme, but something concerning themselves as well. That before which the patient stands defenseless belongs to our shared human condition—mine just as much as theirs. It is precisely for this reason that in Holzhey-Kunz's work, sympathy emerges alongside philosophical listening: the therapist discovers themselves to be a “companion in destiny” to their patient.
And this sympathy, it seems, gently shifts how the person experiences their own suffering. Where before it evoked despair, fear, or shame—“something is wrong with me,” “I am sick,” “I cannot cope with what others handle so easily”—now there is another human being alongside them, who hears in this suffering something of profound human significance and recognizes themselves in it as well. And then, what Holzhey-Kunz calls an interest in oneself can awaken in the patient. Perhaps for the first time, they become curious not only about how to rid themselves of their suffering, but about what it is in human existence that touches them so painfully.
Suffering does not retroactively turn into a “gift,” nor does it cease to be suffering. Yet a new possibility of relating to it opens up: that to which a person once merely fell prey becomes something to which they can turn and attend.
But what happens next? If a person begins to look closely at what was previously experienced purely as suffering, can this become the beginning of philosophizing? And what does it mean to philosophize about that by which you are already deeply touched?
Here, I would like to turn to philosophical practice. In the contemporary world, under this name as well as “philosophical counseling,” there exist many different approaches that invite the possibility of philosophizing within direct dialogue with another person. People come to a philosophical practitioner because something troubles them, leaves them at an impasse, or compels them to reflect on their own lives. They do not always arrive with a question they would call philosophical. Sometimes, a person is only just beginning to grasp what is troubling them and what, exactly, they wish to ask.
At the same time, philosophical practice can hardly be described as a single method with a set repertoire of techniques and clear boundaries. There are varying views on what happens during such an encounter, what the philosopher's role is, and what constitutes its specifically philosophical nature. No less complex is the question of how philosophical practice relates to psychotherapy, especially those orientations that themselves grew out of philosophy. Yet exploring all of this would require a separate inquiry.
Here, I am primarily interested in the approach of the Lithuanian philosopher Tomas Sodeika. And to turn to him, I would like to revisit briefly the aforementioned figure of the “knowing philosopher.”
To put it very simply, this figure assumes a rather familiar distribution of roles: there is a person experiencing something, and there is a philosopher possessing knowledge through which that experience can be explained. The person speaks of their anxiety, the impossibility of choosing, or the fear of death, while the philosopher knows about finitude, freedom, and ontological guilt, and can offer a neat philosophical framework.
Yet philosophical practice, as we encounter it with Tomas Sodeika, seems to begin with the renunciation of this very stance. Having had the good fortune to study with Tomas and speak with him, I would venture to say that one of the questions that genuinely preoccupies him as a philosopher and teacher is how it is possible to teach philosophy at all without turning it into the transfer of “knowledge” from a donor to a recipient. His course on philosophical practice is built precisely as an attempt to answer this question.
The crux of the matter seems to be that philosophizing (unlike “philosophical knowledge,” which can be transmitted by introducing a text or explaining a thinker's line of thought) must somehow happen to the person themselves. For Sodeika, philosophical practice returns philosophy from texts and theories back into living dialogue: into the concrete situation of meeting a person who does not necessarily arrive with a philosophical question, but rather with an existential knot they do not yet fully understand and cannot always articulate. Following Achenbach, the philosophical practitioner becomes a kind of “specialist in non-specialization”: they do not treat the person before them as a case study for a familiar theory, nor do they know in advance which philosophical apparatus should be applied. Together, they try to understand what is truly happening with the person and what question is actually emerging here.
And so I wish to take the next small step and ask myself: how is philosophical practice possible with the person I call a client? More specifically, can an unwilling philosopher discover the possibility of philosophizing pavoĺna, and what needs to happen for this to become possible?
As an existential therapist who intends to remain one, I view the possibilities of philosophical practice precisely through the lens of my own therapeutic work. Of course, existential therapy grew out of philosophy; its philosophical dimension can never be extracted. Philosophizing, in the broad sense of the word, is already woven into the very fabric of existential therapy. At times, the line between philosophical practice and existential therapy can feel quite blurred. Yet it matters to me not to lose sight of where I am and the nature of the relationship in which these questions arise. That is why I say “client,” even though Holzhey-Kunz more often says “patient,” and a philosophical counselor, following Achenbach, might call the person a “guest.” The space in which I seek the possibility of philosophizing together remains, firmly, the therapist's office.
A wide variety of clients come to me with all kinds of concerns, and perhaps not every one of them is a classic “unwilling philosopher.” The fundamental conditions of human existence touch each of us, and each of us may be sensitive to them to some degree. But not everyone lives like a person with perfect pitch forced to live inside a jackhammer factory.
I am especially interested here in precisely these clients: people whose acute sensitivity to the conditions of their own existence reveals itself in suffering—sometimes so severe that clinical thinking might describe it as a psychiatric disorder, while Holzhey-Kunz's lens allows us to see in the sufferer an “unwilling philosopher.” It is with such unwilling philosophers that I am most drawn to explore the possibilities of philosophical practice. Yet answering how such a practice is possible cannot be done, I believe, except by turning to the practice itself.
In my work, there are many concrete examples that could illuminate this question from various angles. However, to preserve confidentiality, so many essential details would have to be altered or omitted that the examples themselves would lose much of their meaning. Therefore, I decided to take another path and try to gather what I have learned from my experience as a whole.
And here is what I noticed. With certain clients, over the course of our therapy, something emerges from time to time that I feel like calling a philosophical circle. Occasionally, we might even share a gentle laugh about it: “Well, look, our philosophical circle has opened again.” Such conversations had been happening in my work for a long time, but only now, as I have begun to explore philosophical practice myself, did it occur to me to wonder: what, exactly, happens between us in those moments when this circle opens? After all, we do not stop being client and therapist, nor do we step outside the therapeutic relationship; and yet, what unfolds does not quite match the usual flow of therapy. Otherwise, we wouldn't be able to recognize so unerringly the moment the circle “opened,” or smile together about it.
If I try to capture what shifts in these moments, on an almost bodily, felt level, I would say that a certain pavoĺnasć enters the conversation, carrying both senses of the word at once.
On the one hand, the question begins to resonate not merely as someone's personal pain, but as a vast human question—and something shifts in the temporality of the conversation. This pavoĺnasć is not slowness in the sense of intentionally putting on the brakes or telling ourselves to slow down. Rather, when such a question truly emerges, time itself begins to flow differently.
On the other hand, a certain freedom seems to appear. At least from my side, I can speak of it with complete confidence. In those moments, I step into the dialogue as a full participant—as a human being touched by this question perhaps no less than the person sitting across from me.
A very subtle shift occurs here in my stance—almost imperceptible from the outside, yet distinctly felt by me. In a therapeutic dialogue, however reciprocal and alive it may be, I remain primarily oriented toward the experience of the person who came to see me. The question that arises between us is one I first and foremost seek to understand as their question—as something uniquely touching their life.
In the “philosophical circle,” however, a faint realignment takes place. “What is this like for them?” does not disappear, but alongside it, in earnest, arise “What is this like for me?” and “What is this like for a human being at all?” And here, “What is this like for me?” does not mean simply retreating into my personal autobiography. I find myself standing before the question not merely as a private individual with a history, but as a human being in the broadest sense—as another person whom this question touches. Our conversation moves beyond the specific story of the one who came to me, centering around a question that belongs to both of us and, at the same time, belongs to neither: what is it like, fundamentally, to be human in the face of what we are speaking of right now?
And this “What is this like for a human being at all?” brings me back to philosophical practice as understood by Sodeika: the possibility for philosophical thought to arise directly from living conversation, from a concrete human struggle, rather than being imported into it as a ready-made theory.
Merab Mamardashvili spoke of this very thing when he asserted that, in a sense, “there is nothing new” in philosophy, that it always speaks of the same fundamental things—and he compared this to love: people have loved for billions of years, yet each time, this state lived through a thousand times before is experienced as entirely new, because it is “reproduced within ourselves.” And then he offers a wonderful formulation: “Philosophy, too, reproduces humans within human beings.” That is, the philosophical question itself may be as ancient and timeless as love, but philosophizing does not occur until that question is somehow regenerated right here—within a concrete human life and in living dialogue. It cannot be substituted by knowing what a philosopher has already said about it.
Yet therapy is also such a living dialogue. At the very least, existential therapy, as we know it, is certainly not a situation where the therapist possesses prefabricated knowledge about another human being and applies it to their case. In this sense, the outward architecture of the dialogue, whether we call it therapy or philosophical practice, is barely distinguishable. Yet I would venture to suggest that what happens to the question itself, our way of being with it, will be different.
In therapy, the question ultimately retains its orientation toward the client's life. Even if it touches me deeply, even if I do not know the answer and we are genuinely searching together, I remain alongside a person for whom this question has become a part of their personal life and suffering. In the “philosophical circle,” a subtle turn takes place: for a time, the question is freed from its tether to personal history and becomes a question of the human condition. This is by no means an intellectual exercise in generalization or a shift to higher abstractions, but rather a change in the status of the question and how we relate to it.
If we ask what this turn might offer the client, I would return to the image of the rope that has been slackened. What once descended upon them as purely private suffering now becomes a question before which we stand together. They remain a person painfully touched by it, yet I believe a delicate turn takes place for them as well: from being the person we are thinking about together, to being the person with whom we are reflecting on the shared human condition.
Let me try to illustrate this with an example that, I imagine, is familiar to each of us to some degree. In close relationships, sooner or later, it becomes impossible not to notice the otherness of the Other. No matter how deep and trusting a relationship may be, another person always remains in some way unfathomable, somewhat beyond our grasp, and we ourselves alongside them remain not entirely understood. I doubt there is anyone who has not encountered this revelation in one way or another within a long-term bond.
Yet for an unwilling philosopher, this reality of human existence is often intensely agonizing. What most people manage to live with becomes, for them, a source of unbearable suffering. The otherness of the Other is experienced as a threat to the very possibility of closeness, trust, and love. The impossibility of fully knowing another person, of being certain of how they feel toward us, of completely bridging the distance between us, can reveal itself with such raw sharpness that the very possibility of being with an Other is called into question.
We can, of course, explore this suffering within the context of the person's personal history, looking at their traumatic experiences continuing to echo in the present. And simultaneously, through the lens of Holzhey-Kunz, we can see behind it a profound sensitivity to one of the fundamental conditions of human existence.
Yet at the very moment this truth hits home, there is, of course, no room for philosophizing. And even later, when the person tries to make sense of what happened or brings their suffering into dialogue with a therapist, being touched by it does not yet mean philosophizing.
Somewhere out there, we have Sartre, who writes extensively and with piercing precision about the hellishness of the Other. Through his autobiographical writings, we know these themes were not merely subjects of theoretical fascination—he was deeply wounded by them from childhood. Yet in Sartre's work, this woundedness is thematicized and transformed into a philosophical problem.
Naturally, there is a distance between the clients I speak of and Sartre. Heaven forbid I ever wonder how to turn an unwilling philosopher into some hypothetical Sartre. But recalling Mamardashvili and his comparison of philosophizing to the experience of love, it follows that to experience love, one doesn't need to be Petrarch, nor is it our task to write about love as Petrarch did. But perhaps there is a task to enter into a special relationship with that which already touches you deeply—a relationship that is philosophical, reflective, and pavoĺnae.
That said, when we speak of existential therapy, it is hard to claim that such a special relationship to what touches a person emerges only in philosophical practice. Yet it seems to me that subtle distinctions do exist here, and they matter.
Let us return to our example of close relationships. A person's own story may present itself primarily as the story of relating to a specific Other who cannot be understood, whose love is thrown into doubt, whose unfathomability is hard to accept. But it is also the story of a human being—any of us—who must relate to an Other who can never be fully known. And then a different question arises: how is it possible to love and trust someone close, if they ultimately remain an Other to us?
It seems to me that questions of this order are what open that philosophical circle. But if the universal human dimension of suffering is also uncovered in existential therapy, what is unique about what happens in this circle? And what place does it occupy within the therapeutic relationship?
Here, I would like to introduce another word whose resonance is dear to my thought: “lot” or “portion” (in Russian, udel). An udel is, quite literally, that which has been apportioned to you from the whole—your share, your part. In the phrase “the human lot” (the human condition), we find this union of the distinct and the shared: each of us has our own lot, but it is a share of what we hold in common with others.
The idea of our shared human plight, the metaphor of being “in the same boat,” runs throughout existential therapy. In Holzhey-Kunz's work, it surfaces in her discussion of sympathy: listening to the patient with a philosophical ear, the therapist finds themselves to be their “companion in destiny.” What has revealed itself so painfully to the other touches me too—simply because we are both human.
Yet it seems to me that in the “philosophical circle,” this shared plight takes on another form. Alongside the philosophical ear, there emerges—if I may continue this somewhat bodily metaphor—a philosophical tongue. And by tongue, I do not mean conceptual jargon, but almost literally the physical organ that, in a different therapeutic posture, I might have preferred to bite. I can be profoundly moved by what a client shares, I can recognize in their question something that touches me too, and yet still keep my own resonance to myself. But when the “philosophical circle” opens, it is as though I allow it to find a voice. I cease to be merely the one who listens with a philosophical ear, and step into the conversation as someone whom this question also touches.
And here, pavoĺnasć—speaking now of myself, the therapist—takes on yet another meaning. It is not quite a willful decision: “Now I will allow myself more self-disclosure and begin philosophizing with the client.” Rather, it is a kind of gentle permission granted to myself to stand before the question too—not knowing the answer, feeling unsettled, disagreeing, grappling. In a sense, it is yielding to the question, which is now addressed to me as well. And my still modest experience suggests that this pavoĺnasć in the therapist can itself have a therapeutic effect. If the sympathy of which Holzhey-Kunz writes allows a person to see in their suffering not merely an illness or defect, but something belonging to our shared human lot, here that commonality also becomes an experience of the dialogue itself. The client discovers another human being beside them who is troubled by the very same question, and who also possesses no final answer. Moreover, sharing the human lot does not necessarily mean making peace with it. What can be shared is also our protest—our indignation, our revolt, the sheer impossibility of accepting certain conditions built into human life.
And here I return once more to that thought of Mamardashvili's, which I recalled when speaking of love. He says that people have loved billions of times, yet each time, this state lived through thousands of times must somehow be reborn within us. And then he adds another thought that is dear to me: our understanding, perhaps, remains the same, but our misunderstandings are different every time. In different eras, people fail to understand being in different ways, and so the philosopher must constantly confront new “walls of misunderstanding,” seeking a new language commensurate with them. Or, as Mamardashvili puts it far less delicately, the “fools you are conversing with” keep changing.
And I would like to add that this foolishness is likely not only historical, but individual. Each of us has our own way of failing to understand the human condition, of resisting it, trying to outsmart it, or somehow coping with it. In the unwilling philosopher, this debate has long been underway; it simply hasn't been taking place in conscious thought. It may unfold through symptoms, through acting-out, through trying to solve in one's personal life what fundamentally has no final solution. And then, that very same struggle that had been playing out in the person's life can finally continue within thought. What once had to be acted out can now, at least at times, be contemplated. And the struggle can now unfold in words—with the question, with me, with Sartre, after all.
Perhaps this is where I should pause. Not because I have arrived at any final answer, but simply because this reflection, too, needs a close. I began with the figure of the pavoĺny filosof, and I would like to return to it in closing. So, who is this pavoĺny filosof of mine?
We see that this is a person who does not choose what will one day deeply pierce them. Yet at some point, that which once only overwhelmed them and played out in their life becomes a question in whose voicing and exploration they begin to participate. And within this participation, a measure of freedom arises: one can think, disagree, contest. To me, this pavoĺny filosof comes alive in relationship—in relationship with another person who also steps out of their rigid therapeutic role to become an equally searching, slightly bewildered philosopher, willing to yield alongside them to the question. But first, that question must be discovered. And for this, it seems, it is not enough merely to listen with a philosophical ear—one must also allow oneself to loosen the tongue.
}







